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The Effect of Quality Cues on Travelers’ Demand for Peer-to-Peer 
Ridesharing: A Neglected Area of the Sharing Economy 
 
Abstract 
The emergence of the sharing economy has had a tremendous impact on the tourism industry; 
however, few quality management mechanisms exist for shared tourism services. Based on 
unique data of 52,248 transactions collected from BlaBlaCar, the world’s leading ridesharing 
platform, this study examines the independent and combined effects of quality cues on 
travelers’ demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing services. The findings suggest that intrinsic 
cues (product reputation and seller reputation) and extrinsic cues (relative price and offer 
duration) are decisive in increasing demand, and their combined effects can be positive or 
negative. In addition, analyses of the heterogeneous effects of intrinsic and extrinsic cues 
across seller segments clarify how consumers evaluate product quality using information 
from multiple cues. These findings contribute to the literature on tourism and marketing by 
providing new insights into the design of competitive product offers in the sharing economy. 
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Introduction 
The sharing economy has become a global socioeconomic trend with influences on resource 
allocation, supply, operations, and product marketing in many industries, including travel and 
tourism (Guttentag et al. 2018; So, Oh, and Min 2018). Powered by digital technologies, 
peer-to-peer platforms have enabled individuals to market unused products and services 
through the sharing economy (Abrate and Viglia 2019; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016). This 
modern consumption model effectively allows consumers to become producers, 
disintermediating many traditional organizations in the value-creation process and providing 
innovative products and services to satisfy consumers’ changing lifestyles and preferences. At 
least 275 sharing economy platforms have been founded in Europe, and 79% of the country’s 
sharing-economy revenue is derived from the tourism sector (Vaughan and Daverio 2016). 
Accommodations and cars are the two most widely shared resources; Airbnb and BlaBlaCar 
operators pose emerging threats to the traditional hospitality and travel industry (Abrate and 
Viglia 2019).  
In the sharing economy, sellers and consumers both benefit from the collaborative 
consumption business, which emphasizes commercial aspects of sharing (Wirtz et al., 2019). 
Collaborative consumption can be defined as the acquisition and distribution of an 
underutilized resource for a fee or other compensation (Belk 2014). Because consumers 
cannot physically evaluate the quality of shared products and services prior to purchase, they 
often complete pre-purchase evaluations of product quality and finalize purchase decisions on 
the basis of non-experiential signals (e.g., seller reputation) (Deephouse and Carter 2005). In 
the peer-to-peer accommodation sector within the sharing economy, information about hosts 
and accommodation rentals help travelers make more informed rental decisions (Ert, 
Fleischer, and Magen 2016). Demographic characteristics also shape the transaction decisions 
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of sellers (how to offer) and consumers (whether to buy). For example, some sellers (e.g., 
white Airbnb hosts) may set higher prices than other sellers (e.g., African American hosts) 
(Edelman and Luca 2014), and some consumers (e.g., female guests) demonstrate a lower 
likelihood than others (e.g., male guests) to purchase certain products or services (e.g., shared 
rooms offered on Airbnb) (Lutz and Newlands 2018).         
Although product quality and demographic factors play pivotal roles in the sharing 
economy, research remains scarce regarding which quality cues affect travelers’ purchase 
decisions about shared products and services provided by heterogeneous sellers. Studies of 
collaborative consumption have primarily focused on how the sales of shared products are 
driven by either (a) intrinsic cues, defined as inherent product attributes that cannot be easily 
changed (e.g., product reputation; Abrate and Viglia 2019) or (b) extrinsic cues, namely 
product-related attributes unrelated to the physical product (e.g., price) (So, Oh, and Min 
2018). The literature has indicated that a set of multiple cues may exert independent and 
interactive effects on consumers’ product-quality assessment and subsequent purchase 
decisions (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Langan, Besharat, and Varki 2017; Purohit and Srivastava 
2001). However, scholars have not fully examined the impacts of intrinsic and extrinsic cues 
on the sales of shared products and services within a single conceptual framework.         
To address these gaps, this research considers the roles of specific quality cues in the 
sharing economy. In particular, we focus on (1) the direct effects of intrinsic cues 
(reputational factors associated with the product and seller) and extrinsic cues (price and 
temporal features of an offer), and (2) the interactive effects between extrinsic and intrinsic 
cues on travelers’ demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing services. Furthermore, given the 
critical importance of demographic characteristics in the sharing economy, this study sheds 
light on product offer strategies for diverse seller segments in terms of gender and race. This 
study is particularly important because platform operators receive a substantial proportion of 
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revenue, as they benefit from a fee per transaction, whereas individual microentrepreneurs 
obtain marginal revenue (Stein 2015). Similar to firms, microentrepreneurs must increase 
their profits by improving the quality of their offers to attract demand and gain a competitive 
advantage (Dervitsiotis 2010).   
Our research makes several theoretical contributions to the tourism and sharing-
economy literature. First, this study represents one of the first empirical attempts to 
investigate cue utilization in the sharing economy, particularly in the context of peer-to-peer 
ridesharing. Specifically, we demonstrate that multiple cues (i.e., product reputation, seller 
reputation, price, and offer duration) should be incorporated as major determinants of the 
sales of shared products and services. Second, we find that the effectiveness of a specific cue 
(e.g., product reputation) depends on its integration with other cue types (e.g., price and offer 
duration) presented to consumers, a phenomenon labeled cue diagnosticity theory (Purohit 
and Srivastava 2001). Finally, we discover that the quality cue mechanism operates 
differently across sellers in terms of gender (e.g., male or female) and race (e.g., majority or 
minority). As such, we seek to apply theories of cue utilization and diagnosticity to the 
sharing economy in the tourism literature. 
In addition to the aforementioned theoretical contributions, this study provides practical 
implications related to marketing shared products and services. Our results suggest that 
ridesharing consumers are likely to evaluate product quality based on information from 
multiple cues. Although the reputation information tied to a product and its seller is more 
useful in purchase decisions than price information, sellers can develop contextual pricing 
strategies while considering their product’s reputation status. Furthermore, given that gender 
and racial characteristics are fixed and influence consumers’ purchase decisions, sellers may 
tailor quality cues from a short-term (extrinsic) and long-term (intrinsic) perspective to 
maximize market performance of their shared products and services. Our findings should 
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help microentrepreneurs better understand how consumers process quality cue information, 
thus enabling sellers to promote competitive products and services on peer-to-peer platforms. 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Quality Cues on Peer-to-Peer Ridesharing Platforms 
Consumers often possess less information about products compared to firms and thus assess 
product quality using different types of information or cues (Kirmani and Rao 2000; Rao and 
Monroe 1989). According to cue utilization theory, consumers’ perceptions of product quality 
are derived from a set of cues (e.g., price, color, taste, and scent) that serve as surrogate 
quality indicators (Olson and Jacoby 1972). Scholars have classified these cues, tied to a 
focal product or service, as either intrinsic or extrinsic (Miyazaki, Grewal, and Goodstein 
2005; Purohit and Srivastava 2001; Richardson, Dick, and Jain 1994). Intrinsic cues evolve 
over time; their valence cannot be changed instantaneously (e.g., brand name and firm 
reputation). Comparatively, extrinsic cues are transient, as their valence can be altered 
relatively quickly (e.g., price and warranty) (Purohit and Srivastava 2001; Richardson, Dick, 
and Jain 1994).  
Cue utilization theory also holds that the extent to which a consumer refers to a specific 
cue when evaluating product quality varies with the cue’s diagnosticity (Slovic and 
Lichtensetin 1971). The cue diagnosticity framework views product quality assessment as a 
categorization process, suggesting that when consumers are confronted with multiple cues, 
relatively more diagnostic cues are used to determine product quality (Dick, Chakravarti, and 
Biehal 1990). In other words, consumers tend to rank cues’ relative importance based on a 
personal ability to differentiate high- and low-quality products (Feldman and Lynch 1988; 
Skowronski and Carlston 1987). On peer-to-peer ridesharing platforms, the product is defined 
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as a ride offer presented by a driver to travelers (i.e., offering use of a vehicle’s empty seats) 
(Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012). When numerous ridesharing offers are presented in an open 
market for travelers, various types of cue information could exert significant effects on 
travelers’ determinations of product quality (Langan, Besharat, and Varki 2017). Offer 
evaluations are likely to be considered in making a final choice as long as overall assessments 
are consistent (Lynch, Marmorstein, and Weigold 1988). It is therefore important to 
distinguish among cue types in shared products and services and to incorporate the 
interactions among them (Purohit and Srivastava 2001; Zou and Liu 2019).  
Drawing from the literature on car-sharing characteristics (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012), 
we focus on four types of quality cues in the context of peer-to-peer ridesharing services 
(Table 1). For intrinsic cues, product and seller reputation (Abrate and Viglia 2019; Purohit 
and Srivastava 2001) represent inherent product attributes, as they cannot be easily changed 
in the short term. In a ridesharing context, product reputation may include all physical 
characteristics of a car, such as the car type and level of comfort (Rhee and Haunschild 
2006); thus, reputation represents an important intrinsic cue (Noseworthy and Trudel 2011). 
Travelers tend to regard luxury cars as more reputable than compact cars. In addition, the 
seller’s reputation, which includes their experience (Pera, Viglia, and Furlan 2016), personal 
photo (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016), and third-party or consumer quality scores (Stuebs 
and Sun 2010), will be assessed as intrinsic cues given that rideshare sellers are providing 
travelers a personal service. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Among extrinsic cues, price (e.g., Gibbs et al. 2017; Wang and Nicolau 2017) and offer 
duration (e.g., Niedrich and Swain 2008) may represent prime attributes affecting the quality 
of a specific rideshare service. These attributes influence two critical marketing decisions in 
the open market. In terms of price, a product’s relative monetary value is far more relevant to 
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consumers than its absolute value due to customers’ willingness to pay for a certain branded 
product over another (i.e., relative price or price premium) (Cronin, Brady, and Hult 2000). 
Competitors’ price levels represent a major determinant of retailer pricing (Shankar and 
Bolton 2004), and relative price position can influence retailer performance (Chung 2000; 
Enz, Canina, and Lomanno 2009). Moreover, the duration of an offer corresponds to the 
interval between the initial offer time—when a ridesharing offer is first displayed in an open 
market—and departure time. The latter refers to the period of consumer exposure to product 
information (Niedrich and Swain 2008) and the temporal distance for potential consumers 
who may have different product foci. A close distance leads to a concrete construal, and 
greater distance leads to an abstract construal (Trope and Liberman 2000). 
 
Effects of Intrinsic Quality Cues on Demand for Peer-to-Peer Ridesharing 
On peer-to-peer ridesharing platforms, travelers consider the observed comfort level of a 
shared car when forming perceptions about the ridesharing service’s reputation (Rhee and 
Haunschild 2006). A car used for ridesharing offers passengers utilitarian (e.g., movement) 
and hedonic (e.g., comfort) value (Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994). Research has indicated 
that hedonic products deliver fun, excitement, or pleasure, whereas utilitarian products serve 
practical and functional purposes (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000). For example, high-
reputation cars (e.g., Audi Q5) are likely to deliver hedonic value (i.e., superior comfort), 
while low-reputation cars (e.g., Ford Fiesta) tend to deliver utilitarian value (i.e., mobility). 
Perceptions of high reputation and the pleasure following from those perceptions may prompt 
consumers to favor affect-based processing over cognition-based, leading them to choose a 
highly reputable product (Hagtvedt and Patrick 2008).  
When travelers are confident about a high-reputation car’s functional utility—normally, 
luxury cars have superior horsepower and safety performance—they may prefer a more 
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aesthetically pleasing design (Noseworthy and Trudel 2011). Furthermore, because a luxury 
car more often meets or exceeds hedonic criteria compared to a compact car, travelers will 
likely experience greater excitement during the trip, develop stronger loyalty to the 
ridesharing offer, and become more inclined to engage in positive word of mouth (Chitturi, 
Raghunathan, and Mahajan 2008). Compared to material possessions, service experiences are 
more frequently social and discussed with others, both of which can enhance the enjoyment 
individuals derive from positive experiences (e.g., Raghunathan and Corfman 2006). 
Therefore, in the context of peer-to-peer ridesharing, one can assume that travelers will 
evaluate overall product quality based on product (i.e., car) reputation and choose a highly 
reputable product over a less reputable one (Cabral and Hortacsu 2010). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Product reputation is positively related to travelers’ demand for peer-to-
peer ridesharing. 
 
The reputation of a seller (i.e., driver), as another intrinsic cue, is an integral component 
of the ridesharing experience (e.g., Abrate and Viglia 2019; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016). 
Brand reputation shapes consumers’ purchase intentions (Brady, Bourdeau, and Heskel 2005), 
and consumers tend to emphasize seller reputation (Yoganarasimhan 2013). On peer-to-peer 
ridesharing platforms, seller reputation can offer a competitive edge in distinguishing a 
service from competitors (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Consumers will likely be less 
confident when purchasing experience-based products (e.g., a rideshare service) than when 
researching products (e.g., a car) because it is more difficult to evaluate product quality given 
intangibility (Cui, Lui, and Guo 2012). Research has revealed that the effect of brand 
reputation is more significant for intangible products than tangible products (Brady, 
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Bourdeau, and Heskel 2005; Herbig and Milewicz 1993). Therefore, travelers may encounter 
uncertainty over driver quality due to information asymmetry; as such, seller reputation can 
indicate the true quality of a ridesharing service. We therefore propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Seller reputation is positively related to travelers’ demand for peer-to-
peer ridesharing. 
 
Effects of Extrinsic Quality Cues on Demand for Peer-to-Peer Ridesharing 
As a representative extrinsic cue, consumers consider price an indicator of product quality 
(Dodds, Monroe, and Grewal 1991) and necessary monetary sacrifice (Teas and Agarwal 
2000). Studies on the effectiveness of relative price levels have returned mixed results in the 
hospitality and tourism industry. Some researchers have found that hotels with an average 
daily rate above that of competitors obtain higher revenue performance (Enz and Canina 
2010), while a price-cutting strategy does not allow hotels to gain greater market share 
(Chung 2000). Other scholars have argued that when consumers search for advantageous 
prices, lower prices will positively influence consumers’ evaluations and thus promote loyalty 
toward tour operators (Campo and Yagüe 2008). 
In the sharing economy, price value and the functional attributes of accommodations 
greatly inform overall attitudes toward a shared object (So, Oh, and Min 2018). In addition, 
the price level of a shared object generally includes competitive market characteristics (Wang 
and Nicolau 2017). Although Hamari, Sjöklint, and Ukkonen (2016) identified no effect of 
price on collaborative consumption, most studies have demonstrated that low prices 
(Tussyadiah 2015) or price value (So, Oh, and Min 2018) can each positively influence 
consumers’ choices of shared objects (e.g., Airbnb accommodations). In the peer-to-peer 
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ridesharing market, if a driver sets a lower (higher) price for his or her ridesharing service 
rather than a reference price (i.e., the price level of competitors’ offers for the same trip), 
potential riders may perceive the price to be cheaper (more expensive) (Monroe and Lee 
1999). As the cost-saving motivation is arguably the main factor influencing participation in 
collaborative consumption, ridesharing travelers may perceive relatively cheaper (more 
expensive) ridesharing offers to be fair (unfair) because these customers evaluate fairness by 
comparing benefits or costs relative to competitors’ offers for the same trip (Stefansdotter et 
al. 2015). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is put forth: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Relative price is negatively related to travelers’ demand for peer-to-peer 
ridesharing.  
 
Although the relative price of a ridesharing service may adversely affect related sales, 
the extent of the price–sales relationship depends on the degree of product similarity. When 
two products are perceived similarly, consumers may presume that comparative transactions 
should also be similar, called the assimilation effect (Major and Testa 1989). Suppose that, for 
a trip from Paris to Lyon, two drivers with a similar reputation offer ridesharing services 
using a compact car at 10 euros and 15 euros. Travelers may consider this price difference 
between similar products to be unfair. However, as the dissimilarity between the products 
becomes more apparent, consumers will tend to selectively access information that supports 
the dissimilarity, leading to a contrast effect (Mussweiler 2003). For example, if, for the same 
intercity trip, one experienced driver (in a comfortable car) offers a service at 15 euros and 
another unexperienced driver (in a compact car) does so at 10 euros, observable product 
differences will naturally lead to quality inferences and cost attributions (Bolton, Warlop, and 
Alba 2003). In such a case, travelers will presumably perceive the price discrepancy as fair.  
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In an e-commerce context, many researchers have contended that buyers are willing to 
pay a price premium to high-reputation sellers because a high reputation may imply seller 
quality (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Li, Srinivasan, and Sun 2009), trustworthiness (Ba and Pavlou 
2002; Bruce, Haruvy, and Rao 2004), and greater service quality (Luo and Chung 2010). 
Therefore, it is commonly believed that high-reputation sellers should charge relatively high 
prices (Ba and Pavlou 2002; Li, Srinivasan, and Sun 2009). However, some studies have 
identified a negative price premium effect (i.e., a high-reputation seller who charges a lower 
price than a low-reputation seller) in light of consumer informativeness and seller 
competition (Liu, Feng, and Wei 2012). On peer-to-peer ridesharing platforms, prospective 
travelers can search for and compare offers for a particular trip to choose an offer with the 
greatest utility (Baylis and Perloff 2002). Consequently, high-reputation and low-price 
ridesharing offers should be preferable to high-reputation and high-price offers. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of relative price on travelers’ demand for peer-to-peer 
ridesharing is negative for (a) a higher product reputation or (b) a higher seller 
reputation.  
 
Potential travelers will encounter multiple ridesharing offers for a specific trip when 
searching on a given date. As consumers review relevant information, each offer will likely 
carry either a primacy or recency effect depending on the order of exposure. Specifically, 
consumers may consider the first offer more novel than subsequent offers; later offers may be 
seen as redundant and less interesting, resulting in a primacy effect (Castel 2008; Wyer 
1970). The first offer will generally be preferred to subsequent offers because consumer 
evaluations are positively related to the amount of information known about a service 
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(Anderson 1981; Castel 2008). Conversely, consumers may take the most recent offer as the 
basis for evaluating subsequent offers, otherwise known as the recency effect (Castel 2008; 
Houston and Sherman 1995).  
In contrast to these mixed findings, research has suggested that consumers tend to 
prefer first-to-market products to later product entrants (Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 
1992) due to exposure to product information (Niedrich and Swain 2008). In the peer-to-peer 
ridesharing context, attribute recall will be greater for initially encountered ridesharing offers 
under a long-delay condition (e.g., two weeks before departure) and greater for later offers 
under a short-delay condition (e.g., one day before departure) (Niedrich and Swain 2008). 
Ridesharing drivers may post offers with diverse attributes (e.g., different car models and 
driver demographics) several weeks or days before the planned date of departure. For 
example, when two trip offers from Paris to Lyon are registered (i) two weeks and (ii) one 
day before departure, respectively, potential riders will recall (i) the former offer better than 
(ii) the latter offer due to differential awareness in the marketplace (Boulding and Christen 
2003). Therefore, the following hypothesis is suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The offer duration of a peer-to-peer ridesharing service is positively 
related to travelers’ demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing.  
 
Although early ridesharing offers may encourage sales, the degree of this relationship 
depends on the extent of temporal focus and product similarity. The anticipated timing of a 
trip affects its construal (Trope and Liberman 2000). In tourism, focusing on planning a trip 
in the near future leads consumers to a more concrete construal (e.g., a concretely described 
hotel), whereas focusing on engaging in a trip later in the future leads to a more abstract 
construal (e.g., an abstractly described hotel) (Kim et al. 2016). These construals then 
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influence how consumers process information regarding sets of tourism products (Förster 
2009). Consumers planning a trip in the near future will be more motivated by a set of 
relatively different offers (i.e., the contrast effect); by comparison, consumers planning a trip 
in the far future will be more motivated by a set of relatively similar offers (i.e., the 
assimilation effect) (Förster 2009).  
Research has revealed that as the temporal distance from a trip increases, the appeal of 
the trip depends more on its desirability, namely the value of the trip’s end state (a high-level 
construal feature), and less on its feasibility, referring to the means used to reach the end state 
(a low-level construal feature) (Liberman and Trope 1998). That is, potential riders will 
process each offer’s time-related information (i.e., the duration between an offer and 
departure) differently. For instance, when travelers book a ridesharing service three weeks 
before their departure date, they tend to focus more on being able to travel to a particular city 
on a date for certain (e.g., the availability of a certain intercity trip and the proximity of the 
pickup time and place) and less on the attractiveness of the car. Conversely, when potential 
riders decide on a ridesharing service in the near future (e.g., two days before departure), they 
focus more on concrete features of each offer, such as the reputation of the product and seller, 
which are relatively goal-irrelevant characteristics. Hence, the effect of offer duration on 
demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing services depends on the extent of intrinsic quality cues 
(i.e., product or seller reputation). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The effect of offer duration on travelers’ demand for peer-to-peer 
ridesharing is negative for (a) a higher product reputation or (b) a higher seller 
reputation. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the research model of this study, including a summary of the 
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proposed hypotheses. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
This study examined how product quality—signaled by intrinsic cues (product reputation and 
seller reputation) and extrinsic cues (relative price and offer duration)—affects consumer 
demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing services independently and collectively. To achieve these 
research objectives, we referred to daily transaction data of ridesharing offers collected via 
the French BlaBlaCar marketplace. BlaBlaCar is a popular open-market platform for long-
distance rideshare offers, which launched in France in 2006. As of October 2018, the site had 
more than 65 million registered users across 22 countries, with France (15 million users) 
being one of the most vibrant peer-to-peer ridesharing markets (Smith 2018).  
First, after verifying the technical feasibility of data collection from the BlaBlaCar 
website, one of the authors scraped publicly available data for 40 French intercity (e.g., 
Paris–Lyon) ridesharing transactions from August 2013 to March 2014. The data collection 
procedure was automated by scraping the BlaBlaCar website. Our BlaBlaCar Web scraper 
was built in Java; specifically, we opted for an open-source library (i.e., JSoup) that provides 
convenient functionality for extracting and manipulating data. The data extraction software 
regularly gathered all posted offer information about a specific intercity trip (once per day), 
enabling us to track the evolution of each offer from the offer date to the departure date. To 
improve data accuracy, we (1) monitored errors by using specific application program 
interfaces and (2) performed manual checks randomly twice per week throughout the 
collection period. 
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Second, out of 5 million observations, we excluded 4 million data points because they 
did not include sales information (i.e., no seats sold) and used the remaining 1 million data 
points as the final transaction dataset, which served as the foundation of our investigation. 
After conducting a preliminary analysis of the collected data, our database and findings were 
shared and presented to BlaBlaCar in October 2016. The company provided feedback on our 
findings, confirmed the reliability of our data, and provided permission for the data to be used 
in academic research. The whole dataset was applied to economic research about pricing 
behavior in the sharing economy (i.e., our first study).   
To test our hypotheses in the current (second) study, we chose the four longest trips 
(among 40 intercity trips in France) to ensure a tourism-related sample. We considered trips 
of more than 400 km between two cities where travelers were most likely to stay overnight in 
the destination city. Trips included Paris–Marseille (774 km), Paris–Brest (591 km), Paris–
Lyon (466 km), and Lyon–Paris (466 km). Of these, the non-stop driving time ranges from 
4.5 hours (Paris–Lyon) to 7.5 hours (Paris–Marseille), indicating the difficulty of returning to 
the departure city on the same day. We based our econometric analysis on a sample of 52,248 
transactions provided by 24,697 drivers. Data contained product information related to (a) 
intrinsic and extrinsic cues, indicating travelers’ interest and final demand for each offer; and 
(b) key characteristics of each driver (e.g., name, age, and gender), offer (e.g., round-trip), 
and time (e.g., departure day and time) to control for the effects of these features on demand. 
 
Variables 
To measure Demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing (𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡), we used the number of seats sold for 
trip i offered by driver j on day t. As an offer can be observed from the first offer date to the 
departure date, we calculated the number of seats sold by subtracting the remaining seats on 
the departure date from the number of seats available on the initial offer date.  
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For independent variables, we used two measures of intrinsic cues that were publicly 
observable by potential consumers: Product Reputation and Seller Reputation. Product 
Reputation was self-assigned by the driver and measured on a 4-point scale (i.e., basic, 
normal, comfortable, and luxury) (Abrate and Viglia 2019; Rhee and Haunschild 2006), with 
a higher value indicating a more reputable product. BlaBlaCar classified Seller Reputation 
(Abrate and Viglia 2019; Stuebs and Sun 2010) on a 5-point scale (newcomer, intermediate, 
experienced, expert, and ambassador) based on four criteria: percentage of profile completed, 
number of ratings, percentage of positive ratings, and seniority. As shown in prior studies 
(e.g., Abrate and Viglia 2019), online rating data were collected as an alternative measure of 
reputational factors of the product and seller. However, BlaBlaCar only allowed for a 
dichotomous rating, either positive or negative (i.e., dummy variable). The site’s seller and 
product ratings were overwhelmingly positive (97%), which is typical in the sharing 
economy (Bridges and Vásquez 2018). Therefore, the rating measure was excluded as an 
intrinsic cue variable.  
Regarding independent variables for extrinsic cues, we defined Relative Price as the 
percentage by which the selling price of a specific ridesharing offer exceeded a benchmark 
price (Farris et al. 2010; Noone, Canina, and Enz 2013). The average price charged by other 
competing drivers in a given category (i.e., a particular trip between two cities on a certain 
date) served as the benchmark (Farris et al. 2010). In addition, we defined Offer Duration as 
the number of days between the date when an offer was published on the online marketplace 
and the date when the trip occurred.  
Finally, we included control variables in our model as product characteristics (𝑍𝑗) and 
seller characteristics (𝑊𝑡). For product characteristics, we controlled for whether the 
reservation was confirmed automatically or manually (i.e., a driver approved the request) 
(Manual Reservation), whether the trip was one-way or round-trip (Round Trip), and whether 
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the trip had a detour time (i.e., when the car arrived at a destination city, the driver took extra 
time to bring the riders to a specific place) (Detour Drive). For seller characteristics, we 
controlled for one reputational factor (i.e., whether the driver’s Photo was shown) and three 
demographic factors: Age, Gender, and Race. Age and gender were revealed by the driver per 
BlaBlaCar’s policy. Because race information was not available on the website, we classified 
each driver into regions of origin using three name-matching databases: INSEE 
(www.insee.fr), from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, and 
two well-known French websites (www.prenoms.com and www.signification-prenom.net). 
Therefore, the race of each driver was classified as either French or (non-French) minority.  
To divide sellers into homogeneous groups, we selected two specific demographic 
variables—gender and race—because the intimacy of many sharing-economy transactions 
heightens the salience of these variables (Schoenbaum 2016; 2018). In peer-to-peer 
ridesharing settings, gender preferences manifest from concerns related to privacy, comfort, 
enjoyment, sexuality, and security (Schoenbaum 2016). Race plays a notable role in positive 
or negative outcomes associated with collaborative consumption (Edelman and Luca 2014; 
Edelman, Luca, and Svirsky 2017). Specifically, consumers are likely to be affected by 
antipathy toward a given ethnic group’s services as a symbolic means of discriminating 
against that group, a pattern called consumer racism (Ouellet 2007). In this study, we created 
four segmented samples of peer-to-peer ridesharing sellers (French Male, French Female, 
Minority Male, and Minority Female) by combining these two demographic features and ran 
regression models to generate meaningful results for each segment. 
 
Empirical Model 
We used a fixed-effects panel-data regression with trip-specific fixed effects to model 
demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing and their determinants. Trip-specific fixed effects 
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enabled us to control for the general characteristics of a given trip and to isolate particular 
factors affecting consumer demand. The panel-data regression model can be written as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑍𝑗 + 𝑊𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) is the trip, j is the driver (j = 1, …, 24,697), and t is the day. 𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 
refers to a set of independent variables related to intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues for trip i 
offered by driver j on day t. 𝑋𝑖 denotes independent variables related to the characteristics of 
trip i, 𝑍𝑗  refers to independent variables related to the characteristics of driver j, and 𝑊𝑡 
represents independent variables related to day t when a specific trip occurs. Moreover, 𝜇𝑖 
captures the time-invariant trip-specific effect of trip i that influences the dependent variable 
but has not been incorporated into any explanatory variables. This proposed two-way panel-
data model can resolve potential omitted-variable bias problems (Wooldridge 2010). The 
error term 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is assumed to follow a normal distribution independent from 𝜇𝑖 with a mean 
of 0 and a standard deviation of σɛ.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables incorporated into our empirical model. 
The overall panel dataset consisted of 52,248 transactions from 24,697 drivers across 4 
intercity trips from August 2013 to March 2014 in France. The total sample was further 
divided into four segments: French male (66.6%), French female (20.6%), minority male 
(11.3%), and minority female (1.5%). The mean value of Demand was 2.567 with a standard 
deviation of 0.006, slightly larger than the Past Demand (i.e., control variable) for the same 
trip (M: 1.162; SD: 0.001). French drivers demonstrated slightly better sales performance 
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than minority drivers. For variables related to intrinsic cues, Product Reputation and Seller 
Reputation had mean values of 2.418 and 2.882, respectively, with female drivers displaying 
relatively lower product and seller reputations than male drivers. Regarding variables of 
extrinsic cues, Relative Price had a mean value of -0.001; interestingly, female drivers set 
relatively higher prices than male drivers for the same trip. The mean value of Offer Duration 
was 9.964 (days), and French drivers included longer offer durations than minority drivers. In 
terms of control variables, 42.6% of trip offers included a Photo, 17.9% allowed for a 
Manual Reservation, 22.8% provided a Round Trip, and 48% included a Detour Drive. The 
mean age of our sample was 32.365 years; female drivers were generally younger than male 
drivers. Female drivers and minority drivers accounted for 22.1% and 12.8% of all drivers, 
respectively. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The correlation matrix of the independent and control variables accompanying the 
proposed model is presented in Table 3. Most coefficients in Sample 1 were below 0.29, 
suggesting that no multicollinearity problem existed in this model. Correlation coefficients 
among independent and control variables in Samples 2–5 were also below 0.34, again 
indicating an absence of multicollinearity. More detailed information is available upon 
request. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Research Findings 
Table 4 reports the independent and interactive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues 
of the chosen peer-to-peer ridesharing service on sales performance for the overall (Model 1) 
and segmented (Models 2–5) markets. Regarding intrinsic quality cues, the coefficient of 
Product Reputation was estimated to be positive and statistically significant (0.035, p < 0.01), 
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providing empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. Interestingly, while this positive 
relationship persisted for male drivers (French: 0.036, Minority: 0.053, p < 0.01), no 
relationship emerged for female drivers. In addition, the coefficient of Seller Reputation was 
estimated to be positive and statistically significant for the overall market (0.039, p < 0.01) 
and male driver segments (French Male: 0.035, p < 0.01; Minority Male: 0.111, p < 0.01), 
lending support to Hypothesis 2. These results imply that, overall, intrinsic quality cues—
product reputation and seller reputation—play critical roles in increasing consumer demand 
for peer-to-peer ridesharing services. Regarding extrinsic quality cues, Relative Price showed 
no correlation with peer-to-peer ridesharing demand, failing to support Hypothesis 3; this 
lack of relationship persisted across all four segments. The coefficient of Offer Duration was 
estimated to be positive and significant in the overall market (0.005, p < 0.01), particularly 
among male drivers (French Male: 0.006, p < 0.01; Minority Male: 0.014, p < 0.01), 
supporting Hypothesis 5. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Although the relative price of a peer-to-peer ridesharing offer had no direct effect on its 
demand, its association with the higher reputation of a product or seller tended to reduce 
associated demand (Relative Price × Product Reputation: -0.139; Relative Price × Seller 
Reputation: -0.105, p < 0.01), providing support for Hypothesis 4. The negative effect of the 
relative price–product reputation association was more pronounced within the French female 
(-0.183, p < 0.05) and minority male (-0.332, p < 0.01) segments. The negative effect of the 
relative price–seller reputation association also held for male drivers (French Male: -0.098, p 
< 0.01; Minority Male: -0.217, p < 0.05). Moreover, the relationship between offer duration 
and higher product reputation negatively influenced demand (-0.001, p < 0.05), lending 
support to Hypothesis 6a; this negative effect was mainly applicable to French male drivers (-
0.002, p < 0.01). Lastly, the association between offer duration and higher seller reputation 
22 
exerted a marginally significant and positive effect on related demand (0.001, p < 0.10), 
which did not support Hypothesis 6b. However, this positive effect was significant among 
French male drivers (0.001, p < 0.01). These results indicate that the effects of extrinsic cues 
(i.e., relative price and offer duration) on peer-to-peer ridesharing demand depend on the 
level of intrinsic cues (i.e., reputational factors) across seller segments.  
We verified the robustness of our analysis (Model 1: a 4-trip sample) by testing two 
alternative models based on (1) a 3-trip sample (Paris–Brest, Paris–Lyon, and Paris–
Marseille) consisting of 30,489 observations (Model 6) and (2) a 2-trip sample (Paris–Lyon 
and Lyon–Paris) consisting of 42,792 observations (Model 7). Table 5 presents the results of 
parameter estimates, which are consistent with those in Table 4, with one exception: the 
correlation between offer duration and higher seller reputation demonstrated no relationship 
with associated demand (Model 6), in contrast to the finding from the main model (i.e., 
marginally significant). However, the results of Models 1 and 6 did not support Hypothesis 
6b; analysis results of these alternative samples thus aligned with our main findings. Table 6 
lists hypothesis-testing results based on the main model. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Due to the promising growth of online sharing-economy platforms, microentrepreneurs 
should be provided product-quality management mechanisms to design more competitive 
offers and maximize their market performance. Microentrepreneurs in the sharing economy, 
especially in an open market (e.g., BlaBlaCar), generally lack the marketing capabilities to 
deliver competitive products compared to market-managed platforms (e.g., Uber). Although 
researchers have investigated the dynamics of quality cue mechanisms (e.g., Langan, 
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Besharat, and Varki 2017), empirical evidence for these mechanisms’ dynamic roles in the 
sharing economy and tourism industry has not been demonstrated. To fill this gap, we 
explored how different quality cues—intrinsic (i.e., product reputation and seller reputation) 
and extrinsic (i.e., relative price and offer duration)—affect consumer demand for peer-to-
peer ridesharing services relative to microentrepreneurs in general and specifically (e.g., 
racial minorities and women). 
Given assumed independent and combined effects of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on 
travelers’ demand for ridesharing services, rich secondary data were collected from 
BlaBlaCar, a leading intercity ridesharing platform. Our findings suggest that intrinsic cues, 
(i.e., reputational factors of the product and seller) are decisive in driving demand, whereas 
extrinsic cues increase demand in part (i.e., no relationship with relative price but a positive 
relationship with offer duration). Moreover, an analysis of the combined effects of intrinsic 
and extrinsic cues facilitates our understanding of how consumers evaluate overall quality 
based on multi-cue information. These findings imply that the combination of reputational 
factors (product and seller) and a price premium influences consumers’ purchase decisions; 
essentially, consumers are well-informed about alternative offers and therefore expect a more 
reputable seller to charge a lower relative price than a less reputable seller. Additional 
findings indicate that consumers’ purchase decisions are shaped by the combination of offer 
duration (short versus long) and product reputation (low versus high). Specifically, when a 
ridesharing service is offered at an early (late) stage before a given departure date, consumers 
tend to regard ridesharing services similarly (dissimilarly). The association of an offer with 
product reputation thus appears to exert a weak (strong) impact on consumers’ overall quality 
evaluations and further reduces (increases) demand. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
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Concerning theoretical contributions, this study is one of the first to examine cue utilization 
theories relative to the sharing economy in general and peer-to-peer ridesharing platforms in 
particular. Based on research on access-based ridesharing (Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012), this 
study introduces novel dimensions of peer-to-peer ridesharing quality cues by adding two 
intrinsic cues (product reputation, as a material [functional] object; seller reputation, as an 
immaterial [experiential] object) and two extrinsic cues (price and offer duration) that have 
been overlooked in the literature. Prior tourism and hospitality studies have evaluated the 
roles of intrinsic cues (e.g., personal reputation and product reputation) (Abrate and Viglia 
2019; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016; Mauri et al. 2018) or extrinsic cues (e.g., price) (So, 
Oh, and Min 2018; Tussyadiah and Pesonen 2016) in the sharing economy; however, such 
studies have often considered both types of cues separately and focused on accommodation-
sharing contexts (e.g., Airbnb). Our study demonstrates the independent and combined effects 
of intrinsic and extrinsic cues on peer-to-peer ridesharing demand, extending the scope of cue 
utilization theories (Langan, Besharat, and Varki 2017). 
By incorporating intrinsic as well as extrinsic cues, our work also enriches the literature 
on cue diagnosticity theory, which suggests that quality assessments are performed with 
regard for multiple cues (Purohit and Srivastava 2001). Research on cue diagnosticity has 
examined the effectiveness of information from multiple cues of business-to-consumer 
products (e.g., Langan, Besharat, and Varki 2017; Purohit and Srivastava 2001; Zou and Liu 
2019), but no studies have explored multiple cues within the sharing economy. Our research 
empirically demonstrates that the diagnosticity of some cue types depends on other cue types 
in the sharing economy, which can be further explained by two theories. First, empirical 
evidence concerning the combined effect of reputational and price factors has revealed 
different views related to social comparison theory (Major and Testa 1989), in which 
consumers tend to perceive a price discrepancy among dissimilar products (due to product or 
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seller reputation) as fair. By contrast, our study presents a negative price premium effect for 
high-reputation products in an online marketplace where consumers possess extensive 
information about alternative products (Liu, Feng, and Wei 2012). Second, the combination 
of reputational and temporal factors extends construal level theory, in which consumers 
process information about multiple alternative products differently depending on the 
anticipated timing of an activity (Trope and Liberman 2000). We have found that the late 
market entry of a ridesharing offer can lead consumers to a more concrete construal, which 
compels buyers to focus on distinct features (e.g., product reputation) of alternative offers. 
Although numerous studies have investigated collaborative consumption and the 
sharing economy, few have considered the differential effectiveness of quality cues across 
seller segments. Most research has instead dealt with consumer-oriented segmentation in 
tourism (e.g., Khoo-Lattimore and Prayag 2015) and in the sharing economy (e.g., Lutz and 
Newlands 2018). However, segmentation can be applied to consumers and suppliers in the 
sharing economy because participants may be discriminated against due to race (Edelman and 
Luca 2014) and gender (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016). This study empirically shows the 
variable effectiveness of intrinsic and extrinsic cues across seller segments on the basis of 
race and gender. Specifically, quality cue mechanisms in the ridesharing context appear more 
critical for male sellers than female sellers, different from findings within the peer-to-peer 
accommodation market (Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016). Our results also indicate that the 
combined effects of multiple cues are more pronounced for racial minority sellers than 
majority sellers. This finding supplements research by Doleac and Stein (2013), who found 
that minority sellers suffered from lower trust and worse market outcomes than majority 
sellers. Our work also confirms the existence of gender and racial discrimination on sharing-
economy platforms (Edelman and Luca 2014; Ert, Fleischer, and Magen 2016). 
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Practical Implications 
These findings have important managerial implications for peer-to-peer ridesharing sellers. 
First, sellers must understand that ridesharing consumers infer overall product quality from 
combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic cues. Under the assumption that product reputation is 
fixed (i.e., switching from a compact car to a luxury car is unrealistic), sellers can improve 
their personal reputation by revealing all profile information, increasing the number of total 
and positive ratings, or offering ridesharing services on the open market as early as possible. 
Although intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues should both be managed for overall quality 
evaluations, this study suggests that intrinsic cues are more critical in purchase decisions than 
extrinsic cues. 
Second, this study implies that online sellers on sharing-economy platforms should 
consider contextual pricing strategies to maximize sales. For instance, if a driver has superior 
intrinsic quality cues through product reputation (e.g., a luxury sedan) or seller reputation 
(e.g., higher ratings), she should set a relatively lower price compared to competitors’ offers. 
A profile of a ‘good’ driver (one who charges a lower price and provides superior service) 
will outperform that of a ‘normal’ driver (high reputation and high price) or a ‘poor’ driver 
(high price and poor services) (Baylis and Perloff 2002). Furthermore, a driver should post 
her offer early if she has inferior intrinsic quality; early offers can boost sales, such as by 
enhancing consumers’ information exposure and attracting more attention from goal-oriented 
customers. 
Third, our study provides valuable insight into how certain sellers (e.g., racial 
minorities and women) can manage quality cues of ridesharing services to maximize sales. 
Our findings suggest that non-minority female sellers with a highly reputable product (e.g., a 
comfortable car) can benefit from charging relatively lower prices compared to the prices of 
other (male) competitors. The rationale behind this strategic pricing may be due to gender-
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based differences in prosocial behavior; scholars have noted that men’s sharing behavior is 
more pronounced in short-term contexts, whereas women’s sharing behavior occurs in 
longer-term contexts within close relationships (Eagly and Crowley 1986). This pattern may 
imply gender bias in the peer-to-peer ridesharing market. Therefore, female sellers can use a 
negative price premium strategy (i.e., a high-reputation seller charges a lower price than a 
low-reputation seller) to maximize sales (Liu, Feng, and Wei 2012). Our results show that this 
negative price premium strategy is also valid for minority male sellers (Edelman and Luca 
2014).  
Lastly, the most controversial finding from our segmentation study is that four types of 
quality cues apparently have no relationship with demand for minority women’s ridesharing 
services. Due to the presence of intimacy (i.e., the revelation of personal information) in peer-
to-peer markets, minority female sellers are likely to experience discrimination because of 
stereotypical images associated with specific ethnic cultures, religions, and practices 
(Davidson, Fielden, and Omar 2010). Hence, sharing-economy platforms should address 
racial and gender discrimination by reducing the intimacy of transactions, especially by 
making transactions more anonymous (Schoenbaum 2018). To achieve equality for sellers 
and consumers, policymakers should also encourage these platforms to take 
antidiscrimination measures by reducing the salience of personal traits in the market. In 
addition, because our proposed model including four types of quality cues did not predict 
demand for shared products and services offered by minority female sellers, future research 
can identify alternative quality cues (e.g., consumer reviews and ratings) that determine sales 
of these sellers’ shared products.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study has several limitations that can serve as opportunities for future research. First, we 
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did not consider consumer characteristics to assess whether the effects of intrinsic and 
extrinsic quality cues on demand may vary by consumer segments. Future studies should 
consider demand-side segmentation based on demographics (e.g., age, gender, and race) and 
consumption behavior (e.g., ridesharing participation and visiting behavior) (Johns and 
Gyimóthy 2002). Second, although the dataset adopted in this study consisted of more than 
52,000 observations, it only covered an 8-month period in the French market; researchers 
could examine the dynamics of the peer-to-peer ridesharing market over a longer period and 
across different countries to further investigate the interplay among intrinsic cues, extrinsic 
cues, and sales. Finally, future studies may extend the theoretical framework of quality cue 
typologies by considering additional quality cues. As shown in the tourism and hospitality 
literature (Banerjee and Chua 2016; Zhang et al. 2013), perceived quality of peer-to-peer 
ridesharing offers can be evidenced by the number of online reviews (i.e., volume) and 
average ratings (i.e., valence). The volume of online reviews and the valence of positive 
reviews may positively influence peer-to-peer ridesharing demand. 
Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of the potential effects of 
collaborative consumption in the tourism industry and sharing economy by examining how 
different quality cues shape demand for peer-to-peer ridesharing independently and 
collectively. Our results indicate that intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues affect demand for 
peer-to-peer ridesharing services, providing a useful guideline for microentrepreneurs to 
design competitive product offers in the online marketplace. 
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Table 1. Classification of quality cues in peer-to-peer ridesharing services. 
Dimension Definition Context of peer-to-peer ridesharing Type of quality cue 
Type of accessed object Nature of service access  Product reputation (functional or material) 
Seller reputation (experiential or immaterial) 
Intrinsic 
Anonymity Relationship with car-sharing providers and other 
consumers 
Seller reputation (experiential or immaterial) Intrinsic 
Market mediation Level of market mediation Price Extrinsic 
Temporality Duration of access to car-sharing service Offer duration between posting and departure times Extrinsic 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables in total and segmented samples. 
  
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
(Total) (French Male)  (French Female) (Minority Male) (Minority Female)  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Demand* 2.567 0.006 2.700 0.007 2.437 0.011 2.119 0.017 1.827 0.038 
Past Demand 1.162 0.001 1.165 0.001 1.166 0.001 1.142 0.002 1.139 0.006 
Product Reputation 2.418 0.005 2.489 0.006 2.094 0.010 2.610 0.016 2.248 0.038 
Seller Reputation 2.882 0.006 2.961 0.008 2.578 0.013 2.973 0.020 2.865 0.051 
Relative Price -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.010 0.001 -0.014 0.002 0.031 0.004 
Offer Duration 9.964 0.049 10.003 0.059 11.089 0.116 7.797 0.117 9.152 0.374 
Manual Reservation 0.179 0.002 0.167 0.002 0.199 0.004 0.201 0.005 0.289 0.016 
Round Trip 0.228 0.002 0.219 0.002 0.243 0.004 0.248 0.006 0.282 0.016 
Detour Drive 0.480 0.002 0.492 0.003 0.480 0.005 0.418 0.006 0.427 0.018 
Photo 0.426 0.002 0.465 0.003 0.327 0.005 0.389 0.006 0.353 0.017 
Age 32.365 0.044 33.004 0.056 30.409 0.094 32.348 0.104 30.940 0.348 
Gender 0.221 0.002         
Race 0.128 0.001         
Number of observations 
 
52,248 
(100%) 
34,816 
(66.6%) 
10,745 
(20.6%) 
5,902 
(11.3%) 
785 
(1.5%) 
Number of drivers 
 
24,697 
(100%) 
15,358 
(62.2%) 
6,449 
(26.1%) 
2,449 
(9.9%) 
441 
(1.8%) 
* Demand indicates dependent variable. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix of independent variables. 
Sample 1: Total (N = 52,248) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 (1) Past Demand 1.00           
 (2) Product Reputation 0.02 1.00          
 (3) Seller Reputation 0.02 0.29 1.00         
 (4) Relative Price -0.09 -0.04 -0.10 1.00        
 (5) Offer Duration 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.05 1.00        
 (6) Manual Reservation -0.05 -0.04 -0.11 0.08 0.00 1.00      
 (7) Round Trip 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.09 -0.01 1.00      
 (8) Detour Drive 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 1.00    
 (9) Photo 0.00 0.17 0.26 -0.06 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.00 1.00   
 (10) Age -0.06 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 1.00  
 (11) Gender 0.01 -0.16 -0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 1.00  
 (12) Race -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 
Sample 2: French Male (N = 
34,816) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   
 (1) Past Demand 1.00           
 (2) Product Reputation 0.02 1.00          
 (3) Seller Reputation 0.02 0.28 1.00         
 (4) Relative Price -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 1.00        
 (5) Offer Duration 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.05 1.00        
 (6) Manual Reservation -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 0.07 -0.02 1.00      
 (7) Round Trip 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.08 -0.01 1.00      
 (8) Detour Drive 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 1.00    
 (9) Photo 0.00 0.15 0.24 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.00 1.00   
 (10) Age -0.07 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 1.00  
Sample 3: French Female (N = 
10,745) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   
 (1) Past Demand 1.00           
 (2) Product Reputation 0.02 1.00          
 (3) Seller Reputation 0.02 0.26 1.00         
 (4) Relative Price -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 1.00        
 (5) Offer Duration 0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.03 1.00        
 (6) Manual Reservation -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.03 1.00      
 (7) Round Trip 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.11 -0.02 1.00      
 (8) Detour Drive 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 1.00    
 (9) Photo 0.00 0.16 0.25 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 1.00   
 (10) Age -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 1.00  
Sample 4: Minority Male (N = 
5,902) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   
 (1) Past Demand 1.00           
 (2) Product Reputation 0.04 1.00          
 (3) Seller Reputation 0.07 0.34 1.00         
 (4) Relative Price -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 1.00        
 (5) Offer Duration -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.09 1.00        
 (6) Manual Reservation -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.03 1.00      
 (7) Round Trip -0.02 -0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 -0.01 1.00      
 (8) Detour Drive 0.01 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.06 1.00    
 (9) Photo -0.02 0.22 0.31 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00   
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 (10) Age -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 1.00  
Sample 5: Minority Female (N = 
785) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   
 (1) Past Demand 1.00           
 (2) Product Reputation 0.00 1.00          
 (3) Seller Reputation -0.04 0.33 1.00         
 (4) Price -0.09 -0.13 -0.08 1.00        
 (5) Offer Duration -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.03 1.00        
 (6) Manual Reservation 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.18 1.00      
 (7) Round Trip 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.13 -0.10 1.00      
 (8) Detour Drive -0.02 -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.04 1.00    
 (9) Photo -0.05 0.15 0.39 -0.05 -0.02 -0.10 -0.01 -0.19 1.00   
  (10) Age -0.03 0.11 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.11 0.08 -0.06 1.00    
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Table 4. Estimation results of fixed-effect models with performance measure. 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Total) 
Model 2 
(French Male) 
Model 3 
(French Female) 
Model 4 
(Minority Male) 
Model 5 
(Minority Female) 
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Past Demand 0.346** 0.033 0.395** 0.041 0.377** 0.068 0.045 0.098 0.312* 0.236 
Product Reputation 0.035** 0.007 0.036** 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.053** 0.020 0.099 0.049 
Seller Reputation 0.039** 0.005 0.035** 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.111** 0.016 -0.040 0.040 
Relative Price 0.153 0.116 0.068 0.153 -0.050 0.218 0.388 0.323 0.121 0.999 
Offer Duration 0.005** 0.001 0.006** 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.014** 0.005 0.006 0.010 
Relative Price ×  Product Reputation -0.139** 0.040 -0.063 0.051 -0.183* 0.083 -0.332** 0.104 0.215 0.304 
Relative Price ×  Seller Reputation -0.105** 0.030 -0.098** 0.037 -0.006 0.064 -0.217* 0.091 -0.190 0.242 
Offer Duration ×  Product Reputation -0.001* 0.000 -0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.004 
Offer Duration ×  Seller Reputation 0.001† 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 
Manual Reservation -1.069** 0.014 -1.154** 0.018 -1.171** 0.025 -0.523** 0.042 -0.647** 0.082 
Round Trip 0.029† 0.013 0.023 0.016 0.034 0.023 0.020 0.040 0.219** 0.083 
Detour Drive -0.006 0.011 -0.025† 0.013 0.050* 0.020 -0.025 0.035 0.173* 0.077 
Photo 0.039** 0.011 0.038** 0.014 0.021 0.022 0.035 0.037 0.042 0.084 
Age 0.034** 0.003 0.040** 0.004 0.012† 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.050* 0.024 
Age2 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
Gender -0.224** 0.013         
Race -0.544** 0.016         
Constant 1.748** 0.083 1.619** 0.104 2.106** 0.164 1.525*** 0.280 0.547 0.554 
Departure time dummies Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Departure day dummies Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  Controlled  
Number of observations 52,248  34816  10745  5902  785  
Number of drivers 24,697  15,358  6,449  2,449  441  
σμ 0.037  0.046  0.016  0.080  0.037  
σɛ 1.188  1.221  1.009  1.274  0.992  
Within R_square 0.168  0.153  0.208  0.078  0.154  
Between R_square 0.799  0.743  0.995  0.099  0.828  
Overall R_square 0.169  0.153  0.208  0.077  0.156  
Note: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. S.E. denotes standard error. 
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Table 5. Results of robustness check based on analysis of alternative samples. 
Variable 
Model 6 
(3-trip sample) 
Model 7 
(2-trip sample) 
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Past Demand 0.297 0.040 0.448** 0.042 
Product Reputation 0.031** 0.009 0.033** 0.008 
Seller Reputation 0.043** 0.007 0.044** 0.006 
Relative Price 0.156 0.147 0.110 0.132 
Offer Duration 0.007** 0.002 0.004** 0.001 
Relative Price ×  Product Reputation -0.123* 0.050 -0.171** 0.046 
Relative Price ×  Seller Reputation -0.113** 0.037 -0.100** 0.033 
Offer Duration ×  Product Reputation -0.001* 0.001 -0.001† 0.000 
Offer Duration ×  Seller Reputation 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 
Manual Reservation -1.062** 0.018 -1.052** 0.015 
Round Trip 0.008 0.017 0.044** 0.014 
Detour Drive -0.007 0.014 0.000 0.012 
Photo 0.039** 0.015 0.039** 0.012 
Age 0.032** 0.004 0.036** 0.004 
Age2 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 
Gender -0.227** 0.017 -0.208** 0.014 
Race -0.546** 0.021 -0.546** 0.017 
Constant 1.905** 0.109 1.562** 0.095 
Departure time dummies Controlled  Controlled  
Departure day dummies Controlled  Controlled  
Number of observations 30,489  42,792  
Number of drivers 18,168  20,741  
σμ 0.043  0.014  
σɛ 1.192  1.176  
Within R_square 0.165  0.172  
Between R_square 0.809  1.000  
Overall R_square 0.166  0.172  
Note: † p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. S.E. denotes standard error. 
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Table 6. Results of hypothesis testing based on main model (Model 1: Total sample). 
Hypothesis Type of effect Finding Hypothesis testing 
1 Product reputation  Demand Direct Positive Supported 
2 Seller reputation  Demand Direct Positive Supported 
3 Relative price  Demand Direct Not significant Not supported 
4a Relative price × Product reputation  Demand Combined Negative Supported 
4b Relative price × Seller reputation  Demand Combined Negative Supported 
5 Offer duration  Demand  Direct Positive Supported 
6a Offer duration × Product reputation  Demand Combined Negative Supported 
6b Offer duration × Seller reputation  Demand Combined Positive Not supported 
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Figure 1. Research model and proposed hypotheses. 
